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Traditional analyses of the appropriate degree of decentralization (Tiebout 1956
and Oates 1972) have emphasized the role of local governments in providing
differentiated public goods in response to heterogeneous preferences. The arguments are
usually based on competition across local jurisdictions, or informational advantages at
more local levels. However recently, more explicit political economy analysis of
incentives in the public sector (Besley and Coate 1999, Persson and Tabellini 2000,
Seabright 1996) has placed political accountability at the crux of the debate on
decentralization. An appealing argument in this vein is that citizens exert greater effort in
monitoring government agencies when they are more local, and hence decentralization
increases accountability by bringing government closer to the people (Devarajan,
Eskeland and Zou 1999). One of the mechanisms by which a populace monitors
government is the electoral mechanism. This paper compares voter behavior in local
versus national elections to make inferences about the relative level of electoral
accountability. We use data on votes cast for incumbent governments to analyze whether
voters are more vigilant in local versus national elections. Specifically, we contrast the
determinants of incumbent support in state legislative assembly elections in India with
that in elections to the national legislature, over the period 1960-92, for 14 major states
in the country.
At the outset, we define what we mean by "vigilance" of voters and provide some
support from political economy theory for why this may be a reasonable definition, given
our immediate objective of comparing accountability of central and local governments.
For our purposes, vigilant voters are retrospective voters who evaluate incumbents on the
basis of their overall performance during the entire term in office. Hence, they are
defined as the opposite of myopic voters who care only about outcomes immediately
before elections. This definition is based upon a moral hazard model (as in Ferejohn
1986) where all politicians are of the same "type" (that is, there is no adverse selection)
and the objective of the principals (the voters) is to choose a decision rule that maximizes
their well-being subject to the constraint that political agents pursue their own self-
interest. Ferejohn (1986) shows that one implication of this model is that voters should
Imake their decision about reelection based on actual performance in office rather than on
announced policy platforms. Therefore, our definition of vigilance is derived by
extending the same idea to a setting where there are multiple periods between elections
and voters need to provide incentives for good performance throughout the term in office.
The goal of this paper is to study voting behavior in state and national elections in India
to infer whether voters are more vigilant when evaluating incumbents at the more local
level of government.
It is important to immediately highlight that the approach used in this paper is only
useful to compare the relative accountability of national and local governments in some
form of a principal-agent model, because the argument for retrospective voting as
desirable behavior that promotes electorate interests may be turned on its head when we
consider adverse selection models where politicians are differentiated by competency
levels. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) show that if incumbents receive competency shocks
that are persistent, then it may be perfectly rational for voters to ignore any observations
of performance before the election year, since only the most recent observation contains
information about the expected performance of the office-holder in the future. However,
as long as there is some delay in learning about competence, or if it is persistent for more
than one period, ever adverse selection models would predict that voters should consider
past observations of performance in deciding which candidate would deliver the greatest
well-being in the future.
There exists a large empirical literature that tests whether the performance of the
economy just before elections has a significant influence on the electoral fortunes of the
president and his party in US elections, beginning with the provocative study of Kramer
(1971). The motivation behind this body of work seems to be to identify the issues that
matter to voters, whether income growth, unemployment, inflation, or ideological
differences between the two main political parties. The general conclusion is that high
income growth, and, to a lesser extent, low unemployment and inflation, just before
elections has a significant positive effect on votes received by the incumbent president's
party, a phenomenon that has been termed "economic retrospective voting" (Fiorina
1978). However, Stigler (1973) and Peltzman (1990) have pointed out that these studies
2assume that voters behave myopically by only considering outcomes in the recent past,
usually in just the year before elections. Instead, Peltzman (1990) proposes that an
appropriate model to judge voting behavior should be similar to a principal-agent model
of the stock market where the owner compensates a manager based on all available
information from past performance. Our definition of vigilance corresponds exactly to
one essential implication of this model, namely, that voters should consider economic
information available for all periods since the previous election. Peltzman's results are
consistent with voters using substantial macroeconomic inforrnation to evaluate the
performance of the president's party.
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study undertakes a comparative
analysis of voter behavior in national versus local elections. Although Peltzman (1992)
does study voter response to fiscal policy in both presidential and gubernatorial elections,
his focus is entirely on testing voter preferences with regard to growth in government
budgets, assuming that the decisionmaking behavior is the same in both elections. He
finds that voters penalize both federal and state spending growth, and make their decision
by considering budget information for several periods before elections. Inferences based
on his regressions suggest that there is no difference between voting behavior in US
presidential and gubernatorial elections in terms of vigilance of voters. In his earlier
study, Peltzman (1990) argues that macroeconomic conditions such as income growth,
unemployment and inflation should only matter for presidential elections, and in
senatorial or gubernatorial elections only as a signal to the president's party. His
empirical analysis is consistent with this, although he does not explicitly test the effect of
local economic conditions on gubernatorial votes.
The discussion of the Peltzman papers on voting behavior brings us to an important
limitation of using this approach to make inferences about relative electoral
accountability at local and national levels. Since we study voting behavior within a given
federal structure, that is, a system where local and national governments have distinct
roles and responsibilities, we should expect rational voters to hold the different tiers
responsible for different activities. Ideally, we would like to study the effect of shifting a
particular responsibility from the national to the local level of government. Hence, it may
3be that voters appear less vigilant in elections to a particular tier, but only because the
activity they need to evaluate is more noisy, and not because they exert less effort in
monitoring. For example, if national governments are only held responsible for general
crisis management or foreign policy, then it may be that events just before elections will
have a strong effect on votes. On the other hand, if local governments are held
responsible for overall well-being, then voters may be more likely to consider
performance throughout the term in office. Our empirical strategy focuses on studying
voter responses to general economic well-being in both local and national elections, and
we argue that this allows us to draw some conclusions regarding relative electoral
accountability at local and national levels.
The results of the analysis may be summarized as follows: in state assembly
elections, voters in India reward incumbents for local income growth, and punish them
for growth in inequality, over the entire term in office. However, in national elections
voters behave myopically by rewarding growth in national income and fall in inflation
only in the year immediately before elections. We conclude that the evidence is
consistent with greater voter vigilance and government accountability in more local
elections. The pattern of results shows that voters hold the national government
responsible for national growth and local governments for local growth. National
governments appear to be exclusively accountable for inflation, which may be expected
from intelligent voters since monetary authority rests there.' Both tiers of government are
rewarded for lowering inequality, but once again, voters in national elections place a
disproportionate weight on reductions in inequality just before elections. Additional
results with regard to spending and taxes at the state level suggest that voters are not
swayed by increases in spending and fall in taxes just before elections. This once again
confirms the conclusion that voters are vigilant in state elections, and consider
performance throughout the term in office rather than being persuaded by short-term,
manipulative policies just before elections. Similar analysis with fiscal variables at the
national level has been difficult because of extreme multicollinearity problems, since
I Although  state  governments  have a role to  play in determining  the cost  of living  within  their  boundaries
via restrictions  on inter-sale  trade of commodities.
4national variables do not vary across states. With data on national spending at the state
level it may be possible to draw more reliable conclusions, but this is not available at the
current time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II describes the empirical
strategy employed to test the hypotheses of relative voter vigilance; section III outlines
the data and variables used in the analysis, and section IV reports the results of the
estimation; section V provides further discussion about the reasoning behind the
evidence, and then concludes.
II.  Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy consists of testing whether information from the
incumbent's early years in office is a significant determinant of incumbent support, even
after controlling for information available immediately prior to elections. The analysis
primarily focuses on information related to changes in economic conditions, including
economic growth, inflation, poverty, and income inequality. In estimating the effect of
these variables, we control for several different socioeconomic and political factors that
may have significant bearing on voting decisions. These include variables measuring the
degree of political competition, political affiliation between the center and the state, and
initial economic conditions, such as the proportion of rural population, and levels of state
income, poverty and inequality. Some of these variables may be interpreted as
influencing the proportion of partisan voters in the voting population. These are voters
for whom the ideological position of candidates, whether based on party affiliation,
religion, ethnicity, linguistics etc., matters more than their performance in delivering
better economic conditions. In fact, a large number of voters are probably motivated by
partisan considerations rather than by macroeconomic conditions. After controlling for
these variables, our empirical estimation of the effect of economic conditions reflects the
decision of the "marginal voter" (Peltzman 1990), that is, one who is indifferent between
candidates or parties on ideological grounds, and votes based on economic information.
SThe basic equations estimated are:
(1)  LOCAL - VOTEj, = a,  +  AL  1  ZT ECONi-2 + /8L ECONi,_I + YL  Zt-l  +  L
(T -1)  Lit
(2)  NATN'L  - VOTEit = ai N  +  T8N  ) ET  ECONi, 2 + 8N'ECON;,_ + rNZil-I  +±  gN
where LOCAL-VOTEi, is the proportion of votes received by the incumbent political party
in the legislative assembly of state i in state election year t, and NA TN'L- VOTEi, is the
proportion of votes received by the incumbent political party in the national legislature in
state i in national election year t; ECONE,  is the vector of economic performnance
variables, Zi, is the vector of control variables for socioeconomic and political factors, T
is the number of years since the previous election, a,  is an individual effect for state i,
and Cit  is  the unobserved error. The individual effects are estimated as fixed effects in
order to identify the effect of performance on votes through intertemporal variation
within a state, as opposed to cross-sectional variation across states.
The coefficients AL and 8N  are estimates of the marginal weight voters attach to the
information received in the early years in the incumbent's term in office, after controlling
for the information received just before elections. Therefore, if voters are myopic only
,8-'  will be significant, and IJk  will be insignificant, that is, voters do not pay attention to
the early years in the incumbent's term when evaluating his/her performance. 2 In
contrast, if voters are vigilant we expect /k  to be statistically significant.
There are two potential econometric problems that may bias our estimates of the /Js.
One is an omitted variable problem where the economic variables may be correlated with
some unobservable event, or external "shock," that has an independent effect on political
2We  are assuming here that only new inforfnation affects the marginal voter's decision. Therefore, if an
election occurred at t = 0, and the next one at t = 5, then for the second election we ignore all information
prior to t = 0. This information was fully known at t = 0, and therefore incorporated into the vote on that
day. There are several caveats to this model, since principals may use old information strategically, but for
our current purposes it will be instructive to look at the simple case of contrasting the whole term with the
year just before elections.
6support for the incumbent or his party. This problem is less important if elections occur
according to an exogenously determined schedule, because then our observation of voting
patterns (which depends entirely on the timing of elections) is independent of the
emergence of sudden crisis situations. Therefore, in our empirical analysis we check the
robustness of the results to including only those elections that occurred according to a
constitutionally established schedule. The second problem is an endogeneity issue, since
rational politicians should choose their actions in anticipation of voter responses, and
political actions should affect performance, since otherwise voters would not make
decisions based upon them. If voters are not myopic, this bias would lead fik, the
coefficient on conditions in the early years in office, to be more likely to be significant
since the values of ECONi, will be restricted to a range to which voters respond
favorably. Hence, although the bias will make it easier for us to find evidence in favor of
vigilance, it will stem from the same source as the type of behavior we want to detect. On
the other hand, if we do not find /k  significant, then, in the presence of the endogeneity
bias, our conclusion that voters are not vigilant is stronger. If politicians know that voters
are myopic and manipulate policy to improve conditions just before elections, then the
coefficient fk  is more likely to be significant since, now, the values of ECONit-I  will be
restricted to the favorable range. Again, the bias makes it easier to find evidence of
myopic behavior, but precisely because of the presence of such behavior. There may be
other reasons for voters to place a larger weight on observations just before elections (for
example, if there are persistent competency shocks), but if we find /k  significant even
after controlling for ECONit-I  we may still conclude that voters are vigilant. 3
Another question that arises with regard to our estimation strategy is why use
specification (1) and (2) instead of a full distributed lag model, where the test of vigilance
is a joint test of the significance of the coefficients on the lags for performance in the
early years in office. The obvious reason for not choosing the latter approach is because it
3This  same  reasoning  applies  if politicians  are myopic,  or if they  incorrectly  assume  that  voters can be
swayed  by election-year  policy  maneuverings.
7would lead to both a loss in degrees of freedom 4 and to imprecise estimates because of
multicollinearity. Furthermore, an argument can be made that voters themselves make
decisions by considering average performance over the term in office.
The empirical approach here needs to contend with the trade-off between omitted
variable bias and the problem of multicollinearity between variables. The inclusion of
several socioeconomic variables are good controls for unobservable events that could be
driving the results, but at the same time they may be highly correlated with each other,
and lead to losses in degrees of freedom. All results reported here have been checked for
robustness to the inclusion or exclusion of variables.
III.  Data and Variables
The data set for this study is compiled from diverse sources for 14 major states of
India over the period 1960-92. The state-level data set is described in detail in Khemani
(2000). Data on national growth and fiscal variables is obtained from the budget
documents of the Government of India (GOI) that are presented in various volumes of the
Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, published by the Reserve Bank of India. The
political data on elections is derived from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1995).
Table 1 presents the variables included in several estimations of specifications (1)
and (2), along with their means and standard deviations. The variables listed under the
head of economic performance are included in the vector ECONi,, and those listed under
control variables are included in Zi, The fiscal variables at the state level were added on
to specification (1) to test voter responses to tax and spending policies. Because of the
diversity of sources, and the particular nature of the voting data, the time period covered
varies across variables. The empirical analysis also tests for the robustness of the
evidence to changing samples when variables are included or excluded from the analysis.
4 Since observations  on voting  pattems  are only  available  when elections  occur, we  have a small  sample  to
begin with.
8IV.  Results
In Tables 2 and 3, we present the coefficient estimates on economic conditions
derived from the specifications in equations (1) and (2) respectively, including all the
variables listed in Table 1 (except for national growth and the fiscal variables). The full
regressions are reported in the appendix, in tables A.  1 and A.2. Table 2 reports the results
for local elections. Here, the coefficient on average growth in the early years in office is
significant, thereby implying that voters consider performance throughout the entire term
of the incumbent. In fact, the coefficient on average growth is larger (although the
difference is not statistically significant) than the effect just in the last year in office,
which means that voters reward the incumbent more when growth is sustained over
several periods. The point estimate shows that a 1 percent increase in average growth
leads to a 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of votes received by the
incumbent. Voters punish incumbents in local elections if inequality increases during
their term in office-a  1 percent increase in average inequality in the early years (as
measured by the growth in the Gini coefficient) leads to a fall of about 1.5 percentage
points in the incumbent's share of votes. The coefficient on average inequality is
statistically greater than that on inequality just before elections (at the 10 percent level).
Again, voters value consistent reductions in inequality over the termn  in office more than a
one-shot reduction just before elections. After controlling for growth and inequality, there
is no significant effect of local poverty and inflation on support for the incumbent.
In Table 3 we show the estimates for the effect of economic conditions on the
proportion of votes received by incumbents in national elections. There is no effect of
local growth, but voters punish national incumbents for high inflation just before
elections. If inflation increases by 1 percent in the year before elections, then the
proportion of votes falls by almost 1 percent. Surprisingly, average inflation in the early
years in office has a positive effect. This could be because inflation is picking up some of
the effect of greater national, as opposed to local, growth, and voters may hold the federal
government responsible for national growth. Therefore, we reestimated specification (2)
by including national growth. The result is reported in Table 4. Now, average inflation is
9insignificant, but inflation before elections continues to have a significant negative effect,
although it is smaller in size.
Voters reward incumbents for high national growth in the year just before elections.
There is no added benefit to the incumbent from keeping growth high in other years in
office. Table 4 shows that if national growth just before elections increases by 1 percent,
the proportion of votes for the national incumbent increases by more than 1.5 percentage
points. This evidence is consistent with voter myopia in national elections with regard to
evaluating incumbents on the basis of performance in improving national growth and
reducing inflation. Including national growth in the regression for local elections had no
effect on the other parameter estimates, and national growth itself was not a significant
determinant of incumbent support in local elections (with a t-statistic as low as 0.62).
Tables 3 and 4 also show that voters punish national incumbents for rising
inequality. The coefficient estimates indicate that if inequality increases by 1 percent just
before elections, then the incumbent's  share of votes falls by almost 1.5 percentage
points. Average growth in inequality in the early years in office also has a significant
negative effect, but the point-estimate of the coefficient is actually smaller, thus
suggesting that the incumbent can get the same increase in votes by reducing inequality
just before elections, as by reducing it in all the early years in office. This once again
points towards voters'  myopic evaluation of performance of national incumbents. 5
From the results discussed above, it appears that national governments are held
responsible for national growth and local governments for local growth. Inflation appears
to be considered the responsibility of the national government, since monetary authority
is exclusively exercised by it, although in India, state governments may influence
changes in the cost of living within their boundaries by their power to restrict interstate
trade. Both levels of government are held accountable for redistributive policies that
affect inequality. This pattern is upheld in several alternate specifications: national
5 Growth  in poverty  just before elections  is positively  correlated  with  support  for the national  incumbent.
This  puzzling  result seems  to  be due  to correlation  between  the level and growth  of poverty  just before
elections,  since  when  the poverty  level is excluded  from the regression,  the coefficient  on poverty  growth
becomes  insignificant.
10growth and inflation were never significant in the equation for local elections, and local
growth was not significant in the equation for national elections.
The results discussed above regarding local and national growth, inflation, and
inequality are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of different control variables, or
different combinations of the performance variables.
All the results thus far are based on voting data obtained from elections that
occurred at least three years after the previous one. The constitution of India schedules
elections to occur every five years, so some of the elections that occur before that time
may be precipitated by unobserved events that affect both the economic performance
variables and voters'  evaluation of incumbents. Therefore, in Tables A.3 and A.4 we
present the results obtained by restricting observations to just those elections that
occurred according to the constitutionally established schedule. This restriction leads to a
large loss in degrees of freedom (by at least 35 per cent), and therefore, the coefficients
are estimated much more imprecisely. However, the general pattern of the results for
state elections (Table A.3) appears to be maintained.
The results for national elections are much more sensitive to selection of
observations on the basis of the timing of elections. In Table A.4 we see that the
coefficient on national growth just before elections switches sign, that is, high growth just
before elections is correlated with a fall in incumbent support. However, the coefficient is
barely significant at the 10 percent level. Inflation is also insignificant, but maintains the
negative sign. The inequality results now show a clearer sign of myopic behavior, with
only inequality just before elections affecting voters'  evaluation of the national
incumbent. In general, no variable related to average performance in the early years in
office is significant.
The switch in sign of the effect of national growth may be driven by the exclusion
of election year 1980, which occurred three years after the post-emergency election of
1977. In 1977, the traditional dominance of the Congress party in the national assembly
was broken by a loose coalition called the Janata Party. However, in the next election in
1980, the Janata Party collapsed, receiving, on average, only 18 percent of the total votes.
11At the same time, national growth in 1979 (the year just before the election) was at an all
time low of-7  percent. Hence, the large correlation between output deceleration and fall
of a new and fragile coalition may have been driving the positive relation between
national growth just before elections and incumbent support. When this "event" is
removed from estimation, the relation between these variables appears to be negative. In
light of this evidence, we may need to reinterpret the relation between national growth
and incumbent support in national elections. Perhaps the national growth variable reflects
the effect of actions taken by central governments just before elections in order to
influence the probability of reelection. In any case, the fact that only observations just
before elections matter for voter response once again confirms that voters are more
myopic in national elections.
Table 5 presents a regression on incumbent votes in local elections that adds state
fiscal variables to specification (1). There is no evidence that populist spending increases
or tax breaks just before elections leads to greater support for the incumbent. In fact,
average spending on food subsidies during the term in office has a significant negative
effect on votes received by the incumbent. This is a startling result, in opposition with the
conventional wisdom that the food subsidy is a powerful political tool to sway the mass
of uninformed voters. The result is also extremely robust to a variety of alternate
specifications. It may be that this reflects voter response to other political weaknesses in
the incumbent government, which drives the latter to use food subsidies as an instrument
of appeasement. In addition, increases in current account spending and fall in commodity
taxes just before elections are also correlated with a fall in incumbent support. On
average, voters appear to dislike high investment spending and high commodity taxes.
However, all the results on the fiscal variables imply very low "elasticities" for voter
responses. For example, at the sample mean, a 1 percent increase in average food
subsidies leads to a fall in incumbent votes by only 0.02 percentage points; a 1 percent
increase in average commodity taxes lead to a fall in votes of only 0.4 percentage points;
and a 1 percent increase in consumption spending before elections leads to fall in votes of
only 0.2 percentage points.
12With regard to the control variables, the strength of the opposition (as measured by
percentage of votes received by the main opposition party) in both local and national
elections has a significant negative effect on votes for the incumbent. In national
elections, state income and poverty levels also tend to have a negative effect on
incumbent support. There is no significant shift in the pattern of incumbent votes after the
watershed elections of 1977 when the dominance of the Congress party at the center was
first challenged, as a direct consequence of the state of emergency imposed by Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi from 1975 to 1977. There is also no evidence of strategic voting
based on political affiliation between central and local governments.
V.  Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have interpreted voter responses to economic performance in local
and national elections as evidence that voters are more vigilant in monitoring the more
local level of government. The argument is based on strong evidence that while voters
reward local incumbents for high growth and low inequality throughout their term in
office, they evaluate national incumbents only on the basis of performance just before
elections. The proportion of votes received by the national incumbent increases with high
national growth and low inflation just before elections. The comparison is partly based on
distinct responsibilities of local and national governments, local growth for the local
government, and national growth and inflation for the national government, although
both tiers seem to be held accountable for reducing inequality. In addition, the conclusion
of voter vigilance in local elections is reinforced by evidence on voter response to local
fiscal policy, which implies that voters do not get swayed by preelectoral spending or tax
breaks.
However, the story with regard to national elections exhibits a twist when we
restrict attention only to constitutionally scheduled elections, as opposed to sudden,
midterm elections. In this sample, national growth just before elections is negatively
correlated with the proportion of votes received by the national incumbent, a counter-
intuitive relation that is difficult to interpret as the result of voter evaluation of growth
performance. Instead, it is probable that preelectoral growth is a good proxy for other
13actions taken by the national government to influence voters, an interpretation that is still
consistent with a story of voter myopia in national elections.
There is, however, an alternate explanation for the pattern of results obtained here
that must be acknowledged. It may be that voters in the Indian federation hold the
national government responsible for foreign policy, monetary policy, and overall
coordination of public policies in the country, while state governments are perceived as
having a bigger and direct impact on quality of life. This view would be consistent with
the large developmental role assigned to state governments by the Indian constitution.
Hence, if the voter choice problem is one of policing moral hazard in state government,
and choosing the best candidate for the national office, then the evidence would be
consistent with voter vigilance towards both tiers of government. An adverse selection
model for the choice of the national candidate may easily predict more prospective
behavior, where judgements about competence are made based on performance and
actions just before elections.
We argue that even if the above interpretation is true, the evidence here still points
to greater accountability at the more local level of government, both in terms of greater
expectations of voters and greater risk of losing office owing to bad performance.
Seabright (1996), in fact, defines accountability as the reduced probability that the
welfare of a region affects the reelection of government. Here, incumbents in local
elections are more likely to lose votes due to a fall in welfare (measured by changes in
growth and inequality) at any point during their term in office. National incumbents, on
the other hand, may garner a higher percentage of votes simply by focusing on events just
before elections. In fact, it would be interesting to compare evidence on political cycles in
public policy at national and local levels to see if national politicians are more likely to
manipulate policies just before elections. Khemani (2000) finds that political cycles in
state fiscal policy are rather small in magnitude, with no effect on the deficit, and argues
that the pattern of evidence does not imply political efforts to woo a mass of uninformed
voters. There is a larger cycle in public service delivery by state governments, but that
could also be consistent with high political discount rates due to intense political
uncertainties. Karnik (1990) and Sen and Vaidya (1994) test for political cycles in
14national fiscal and monetary policy, and find that the revenue deficit clearly increases just
before national elections, through both tax cuts and spending increases. The deficit also
appears to be monetized, with a significant increase in credits received by the national
government from the Reserve Bank of India. This initial comparison would appear to
suggest greater preelectoral policy manipulation by politicians in national elections. 6
The Indian evidence appears to be at odds with the large body of evidence available
for voting behavior in U.S. elections. In particular, Peltzman (1990) finds that voters are
very sophisticated in handling macroeconomic information to make voting decisions in
presidential elections, including using past information from early years in office.
Furthermore, voter participation is reported to be much lower in U.S. state and local
elections than in the presidential race. What accounts for this discrepancy between these
two large democracies? One hypothesis may be that greater geographic mobility in the
U.S. allows voters to "vote with their feet" (as in Tiebout 1956) and therefore, the
electoral mechanism of inducing local governments to perform in the interests of the
public is a weaker instrument. 7 Future research on the effect of factor mobility on
electoral participation in local government may be an interesting exploration of the
Tiebout hypothesis.
In conclusion, we raise some issues that are relevant to this discussion of voter
behavior, decentralization, and accountability, but have not been addressed here and may
be valuable topics for future work. First, to the best of our knowledge, there does not
appear to be any theoretical model for why voters would be more vigilant in monitoring
more local levels of government. The answer may lie in a Downsian cost-benefit analysis
of voting behavior, but as yet the precise mechanisms by which marginal cost of
informed voting is lower or marginal benefit is higher at more local levels, has not been
formalized. Second, the analysis undertaken here provides no answer to the question of
whether such vigilant voting in state elections in India is actually successful in providing
incentives to state politicians. The answer is probably negative, because under India's
6 This comparison must be taken with caution, since neither Karnik (1990) nor Sen and Vaidya (1994)
distinguish between scheduled and midterm national elections, so that there results may be driven by
potential endogeneity of the timning  of elections.
15electoral laws there may be no link between electoral victory, in terms of winning a
majority of seats in the state legislature, and the total proportion of votes received by the
incumbent. In fact, the common experience is one of tremendous vote fragmentation in
the face of a divided opposition, so that a candidate may win by a simple majority in a
constituency, with as little as 20 per cent of the total valid votes (Butler et al. 1995).
Therefore, interest group politics may be key to electoral victories in the legislature,
because given a high average level of vote fragmentation, candidates simply have to
round-up a small percentage of votes to get first past the post. Future research on
electoral outcomes at the constituency level may provide a better understanding of
government accountability to the electorate. Finally, this paper does not provide a
detailed political analysis of voting behavior in terms of voters' ideological, partisan, or
strategic responses. For example, how does the emergence of regional political parties in
India affect voters'  choice of candidates to the national legislature-do  they strategically
divide power to have different parties at the center and the state, or do they start voting
for the regional party to the national legislature? The only relevant evidence that we
report on this issue is that political affiliation between the central and state governments
is positively correlated with the proportion of votes received by the national incumbent,
but this relation is not significant.
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17Table 1. Variable Dictionary and Summary Statistics
Name  Mean  Std. Dev.
Dependent variables:
Votes for state incumbent (percent)  35.27  12.02
Votes for national incumbent (percent)  35.86  15.74
Economic performance:
Local growth  2.28  10.21
National growth  2.12  3.35
Rate of inflation  6.68  9.82
Growth in poverty  -0.18  10.86
Growth in inequality  0.03  7.70
Control variables:
State income per capita  1080.31  556.10
Poverty (headcount index)  53.12  12.96
Gini coefficient  29.16  4.02
Proportion of agriculture in state product  0.44  0.11
Proportion of rural population  0.80  0.10
Political affiliation: =1 if central and state  0.61  0.49
govt. Belong to the same party, 0 otherwise
Votes to main opposition, state (percent)  27.22  13.91
Votes to main opposition, national (percent)  28.94  18.53
Year 1977: =1 if year is 1977 or after
Fiscal  variables  (state-level):
Food subsidies per capita, 1973 rs.  0.54  1.66
Consumption spending per capita, 1973 rs.  95.88  57.36
Investment spending per capita, 1973 rs.  23.43  11.72
Commodity taxes per capita, 1973 rs.  58.07  40.39
Table 2. Effect of Economic Performance on Incumbent Votes in Local Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Average in early years  t-l
Local Growth  1.00  0.41
(2.41)  (1.60)
Inflation  0.43  0.10
(1.04)  (0.21)
Growth in Poverty  0.24  0.10
(0.62)  (0.32)
Growth in Inequality  -1.51  -0.76
(-2.51)  (-2.12)
18Table 3. Effect of Economic Performance on Incumbent Votes in National Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Average in early years  t-1
Local Growth  0.64  0.07
(1.43)  (0.34)
Inflation  1.37  -0.93
(3.02)  (-5.56)
Growth in Poverty  0.60  0.59
(1.60)  (2.65)
Growth in Inequality  -1.18  -1.57
(-1.82)  (-4.87)
Table 4. Effect of National Growth on Incumbent Votes in National Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Average in early years  t-1
National Growth  -1.39  1.66
(-0.81)  (2.08)
Local Growth  0.38  0.09
(0.85)  (0.47)
Inflation  0.71  -0.61
(1.38)  (-2.60)
Growth in Poverty  0.58  0.58
(1.56)  (2.55)
Growth in Inequality  -1.08  -1.43
(-1.82)  (-4.42)
Table 5. Effect of Fiscal Variables on Incumbent Votes in Local Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Average in early  years  t-1
Food Subsidies  -3.80  -0.83
(-2.70)  (-0.48)
Consumption spending  0.16  -0.26
(1.52)  (-2.47)
Investrnent spending  -0.50  0.30
(-2.59)  (1.56)
Commodity Taxes  -0.83  0.60
(-3.38)  (2.50)
19Table  A.1  Full  Regression  on Incumbent  Votes in Local Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Avg. in early years  t-l
Local Growth  1.00  0.41
(2.41)  (1.60)
Inflation  0.43  0.10
(1.04)  (0.21)
Growth in Poverty  0.24  0.10
(0.62)  (0.32)
Growth in Inequality  -1.51  -0.76
(-2.51)  (-2.12)
Proportion of agriculture in state income  22.31
(0.53)
Proportion of rural population  178.6
(1.13)
State income per capita  -0.01
(-1.09)
Gini coefficient  0.20
(0.28)
Poverty index  -0.50
(-1.26)
Indicator for year 1977 and after  2.17
(0.33)
Affiliation between state and center  -0.62
(-0.18)
Opposition strength  -0.48
(-3.65)
No. of observations: 77
R-sq: 0.61
20Table A.2  Full Regression on Incumbent Votes in National Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Avg. in earlyyears  t-l
National Growth  -1.39  1.66
(-0.81)  (2.08)
Local Growth  0.38  0.09
(0.85)  (0.47)
Inflation  0.71  -0.61
(1.38)  (-2.60)
Growth in Poverty  0.58  0.58
(1.56)  (2.55)
Growth in Inequality  -1.08  -1.43
(-1.82)  (-4.42)
Proportion of agriculture in state income  -8.18
(-0.18)
Proportion of rural population  64.97
(0.36)
State income per capita  -0.03
(-2.97)
Gini coefficient  0.75
(0.99)
Poverty index  -0.59
(-2.02)
Indicator for year 1977 and after  4.34
(0.47)
Affiliation between state and center  3.45
(1.16)
Opposition strength  -0.25
(-2.60)
No. of observations: 76
R-sq: 0.70
21Table A.3  Incumbent Votes in Scheduled Local Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Avg. in early years  t-1
Local Growth  1.27  0.29
(1.63)  (0.85)
Inflation  0.79  0.39
(1.02)  (1.03)
Growth in Poverty  -0.18  -0.36
(-0.42)  (-1.27)
Growth in Inequality  -0.89  -0.34
(-1.26)  (-0.82)
Proportion of agriculture in state income  -48.36
(-0.83)
Proportion of rural population  29.55
(0.12)
State income  per capita  -0.01
(-0.87)
Gini coefficient  0.12
(0.17)
Poverty index  0.13
(0.28)
Indicator for year 1977 and after  -6.99
(-0.80)
Affiliation between state and center  5.30
(1.08)
Opposition strength  -0.26
_____________________._  (-1.71)
No. of observations: 55
R-sq: 0.72
22Table A.4  Incumbent Votes in Scheduled National Elections
(t-statistic in parenthesis)
Variable  Avg. in early years  t-l
National Growth  3.03  -2.79
(1.35)  (-1.66)
Local Growth  0.07  0.20
(0.15)  (0.98)
Inflation  -0.95  -0.16
(-1.32)  (-0.60)
Growth in Poverty  1.12  0.54
(2.57)  (2.48)
Growth in Inequality  -0.62  -1.07
(-1.00)  (-3.29)
Proportion of agriculture in state income  -36.72
(-0.84)
Proportion of rural population  140.3
(0.75)
State income per capita  -0.02
(-1.47)
Gini coefficient  0.07
(0.07)
Poverty index  -0.44
(-1.48)
Indicator for year 1977 and after  14.78
(1.45)
Affiliation between state and center  2.32
(0.74)
Opposition strength  -0.29
(-3.01)
No. of observations: 63
R-sq: 0.64
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